# Using auctions to allocate parcel logistic services in Hyperconnected city logistics


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
10<sup>th</sup> International Physical Internet Conference (IPIC), Savannah, Georgia, USA, May 31, 2024




# Problem Motivation: Challenges in Urban Cities



\*Cities of 10+ millions inhabitants
Source: United Nations (UN), 2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects










# **Hyperconnected City Logistics**


### Interconnect:


- Cities as nodes of the worldwide logistic web
- City logistic stakeholders into an open multi-party system via systems standardization
  - Coordination, Cooperation, Collaboration
- Multi-faceted activities of city logistics and urban planning
- Multiplicity of urban logistic centers
- City logistic networks into an urban web architecture




Source: Hyperconnected city logistics: a conceptual framework (Crainic, Klibi, Montreuil '23)









































# Logistic Orchestrator and Service Level Agreement

### **Urban Logistic Orchestrator**

- Serving citywide O-D demand, *robustly* ensuring time service guarantees (e.g., 99.9% O-D service guarantees)
  - Predetermined O-D path in terms of logistic activities
- Multi-party service network by outsourcing each logistic activity through term contracts
- Reliable Service Level Agreement (SLA) for each activity
  - Reliable time requirements imposed (e.g., within 40 minutes for Area transport activity at 99.9%)










# Combinatorial Auction for Logistic Activity Allocation

### **Logistic Orchestrator**

- Hyperconnected multi-tier networks
- O-D service guarantees (e.g., x-hour delivery)
- Auction/Bid requirements
  - Demand patterns for each logistic activity
  - Multiple service level agreement (SLA)
     options for each logistic activity
- Multi-party coordination/orchestration via a combinatorial auction
  - Allocation of logistic activities to LSPs
  - Profit maximization for the allocation process




### Logistic Service Providers (LSP)


- Providing logistic services (transport/hub operation services)
- Participating in the auction by submitting bids for logistic activities and SLAs with bid prices
  - Respecting auction and bid requirements (service level agreement for activities)
  - Profit maximization







# Winner Determination Problem (WDP)










1. Network O-D &
Set of logistic activities &
SLA options


2. Bids submitted by bidders (Activities, SLA, \$)


3. Selection of winning bids⇒ O-D Service guarantees


Georgia Tech

# Winner Determination Problem (WDP)










Will the set of winning bids still be able to robustly ensure O-D service guarantees after auction?



### **Associated Uncertainties in WDP**

O-D Service guarantee  $\tau_o$ : 4 hours



 $S_b$ : Claimed SLA of bid b at 99.9% reliability during auction  $\rightarrow \gamma_b$ : Realized SLA of bid b after auction

- **Deterministic** SLAs: All SLAs are respected after auction  $\Rightarrow \sum S_b \le \tau_o$  (O-D Service satisfaction)
- **Uncertain** SLAs: Tactical Auctions ⇒ Information lag ⇒ Unexpected events (e.g., Demand ↑, requiring more resource)
  - Advanced bidders:  $S_b \approx \gamma_b$  Naive bidders:  $S_b < \gamma_b$ ⇒  $\sum_b \gamma_b > \tau_o$  (O-D Service unsatisfaction)


Bidders' Reliability under Information Asymmetry ⇒ Uncertainty in SLA and O-D services ⇒ Profit ↓



# **Methodology Details for WDP**

**Aim:** To design a *robust* multi-party service network with *O-D guaranteed services* while maximizing profit

- Uncertainty in SLAs ⇒ Uncertainty in O-D services
  - 1) Information lag induced by tactical auctions
    - Δ in information (Demand)
  - 2) Bidders' reliability (Historical on-time performance)



### **SLA Uncertainties**

Modeling downside deviation in realized SLAs ( $\gamma$ ) after auction through a discrete and finite set of scenarios ( $\Omega$ )

**Robustness in O-D Services** 

Chance constraints on desired probability of O-D service guarantees through scenario approximation



### **Problem Formulation For WDP**

### Data:

- L: Set of logistic activities
- 0: Set of O-D pairs
- $\tau_0$ : Expected revenue for O-D pair  $\sigma$
- L<sub>o</sub>: Path for O-D pair o (Set of logistic activities)
- $\tau_0$ : Service guarantee for O-D pair o
- R: Set of participating bidders
- $B_r$ : Set of bids from bidder r
- $\rho_o$ : Desired probability level of service guarantee for O-D o
- Ω: Set of scenarios
- $\gamma^l_{rb\omega}$ : Realized SLA of activity l in bid b from bidder r in scenario  $\omega$

### **Decisions:**

- $x_{rb} \in \{0,1\}$ : Selection of bids from bidder r
- $y_{o\omega} \in \{0,1\}$ : Satisfaction of O-D service o in scenario  $\omega$
- $z_{o\omega} \in \mathbb{R}_+$ : Violation amount of O-D service o in scenario  $\omega$

Expected Profit = Revenue — Cost

Select one bid for each logistic activity


Desired probability level of O-D service guarantees using chance constraints

Scenario-Based Approximation of O-D service guarantees



# Case study: Instance Characteristic

- □ Area of a Chinese megacity with a subset of origindestination flows
  - Approx. 15,000 parcels daily across the region between 36 origin-destination pairs
- ☐ Auction items: 21 Logistic activities with 2 SLA options
  - 7 Cluster transport activities
  - 14 Hub processing activities
- Decision makers
  - 1 Urban logistic orchestrator
  - 42 Logistic service providers (bidders)
    - 13 bidders interested in cluster services
    - 29 bidders interested in hub services
- Market Uncertainty Setting (SLA Uncertainty Matrix)
  - Bidders' reliability
  - Δ in information (Demand)







# Preliminary Results: Profit and O-D Service Levels


- □ 500 Simulation runs for each output (deterministic and stochastic opt. model) under two Δ Info settings
  - Realized SLAs of bidders


#### O-D Service Guarantee Comparison for each Δ Info level





#### Profit Comparison (\$) for each ∆ Info level





	Deterministic		Stochastic			
	Avg. O-D Service (%)	Avg. Profit (\$)	Avg. O-D Service (%)	Δ O-D Service (%)	Avg. Profit (\$)	Δ Profit (%)
Low ∆ Info	31.32%	\$35,855.2	99.65%	218%	\$46,621.5	30.93%
High Δ Info	25.03%	\$9,668.4	99.75%	298%	\$44,723.6	362.3%




# Preliminary Results: Value of Hyperconnectivity

- □ Value of Hyperconnectivity ⇒ Benefit of Multi-stakeholder system
  - What if we only allocate activities to limited # of bidders?
    - Imposing hard constraints on # of bidders to choose
  - Deterministic model
    - Tendency to select large # of combinatorial bids from fewer # of bidders with low price and reliability
  - Stochastic model
    - Tendency to select smaller # bids from many # of bidders with higher price and reliability to hedge against uncertainty in SLAs

### Example of model behaviors



Activities associated with Bid 4 from Bidder 1 are covered by different bidders in stochastic settings



⇒ Additional set of constraints to the optimization model to restrict # of bidders to select



# Summary

### Contributions

- Novel winner determination problem setting in line with hyperconnected city logistics
- Chance-constrained stochastic program formulation for winner determination problem

### **Future Research**

- Incorporation of variability risk measures directly into the decision-making model
  - Chance constrained risk-averse stochastic programming
- Modeling regulation/enforcement that affects effectiveness in real-life operations

## Thank you!

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